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Litigation Ethics: A Niebuhrian View of
the Adversarial Legal System
Eric E. Jorstad
Law is the juncture of power and justice in American society. The
practicing litigator wants to use the law as a tool of power for his cli-
ent-he wants to win the case or a favorable settlement. For the litigator,
legal procedures and substantive law are tools in the exercise of power. Of
course, the opposing party's litigator has access to the same tools and seeks
precisely the same power in the law. This creates the great drama (or
sport) of the adversarial system.
From a different perspective, judges, juries, the public, and philoso-
phers generally look to the law for justice. Legal procedures are, in this
view, tools for discovering the truth; once the truth is known substantive
laws can be applied to make the situation right. Litigators, therefore,
should be limited in their advocacy by the law's higher commitment to
truth-seeking and justice. Litigation is less a combat drama than it is a
public moral debate over which side deserves to win.
How can a litigator pursue both power and justice? Is a litigator a tool
of power or an agent of justice? What is a litigator who takes ethics seri-
ously to do?
This Note will consider this dilemma by using Reinhold Niebuhr's
moral realism as a basis to criticize and reconstruct the conventional ap-
proaches to litigation ethics.1 The Note will argue that litigation ethics
cannot be fully understood except in the broader context of political phi-
losophy and that Niebuhr's political philosophy can illuminate the ethical
dilemmas of litigation. Conventional legal ethicists have failed to see that
political philosophy is an essential framework in which to understand the
study of legal ethics.
Niebuhr himself rarely applied the insights from his philosophy to the
field of law.2 It is but a small step, however, to cross from political theory
1. There is no standard field of study called "litigation ethics." There is regular study of legal
ethics, civil procedure, the philosophy of law, and the legal profession-this Note could come under
any of these rubrics-but since the focus of this Note is specifically on the foundations for reflecting
on ethics in litigation, the new term "litigation ethics" has been coined. As will become clear, litiga-
tion is the part of legal ethics to which Niebuhr's insights can most logically be applied.
2. Niebuhr wrote extensively about law in the biblical, theological sense-the law of God revealed
by Scripture and reason-but he rarely applied his concepts to positive law or to legal practice, see
infra notes 23 and 73 and accompanying text (examples of Niebuhr on civil law). For a discussion of
Niebuhr's view of law in the theological sense, see Ramsey, Love and Law, in REINHOLD NiEBUHR:
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to legal ethics; law is the procedural face of governance.' For example,
read "law" for Niebuhr's "politics" in the following theme statement of
his political philosophy: "Politics will, to the end of history, be an area
where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors
of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy
compromises." 4 Niebuhr's political philosophy is built on a fundamental
tension between power and justice. This tension is unresolvable, yet we
constantly fall prey to the illusion that one side or the other can be ig-
nored or eliminated. Very few public actions can fulfill the demands both
of power and of justice; virtually every public action is to a certain extent
misguided and incomplete, an exercise of power that falls short of justice
or a seeking after justice which misconstrues the realities of power. Public
actions, therefore, are always provisional and must be subject to careful
scrutiny and open to constant revision. This Note will adopt as its method
what Niebuhr called the search for "proximate solutions for insoluble
problems."5
This Note will delineate this tension in litigation, with an eye both to
practicing litigators and to those who oversee litigation-judges, rule-
drafters, ethicists, and ultimately the public. Litigators can find insight
into a foundational philosophy in Niebuhr's moral realism. Niebuhr's
perceptions about human nature and society can help one both plan
power strategies and wrestle with the quest for justice in imperfect institu-
tions. The ethical litigator must grapple with a fundamental question:
How does a litigator mediate between the state's interest in the litigation
and the private parties' struggle for power through the law? This Note
will use Niebuhr's concepts to show that litigators are mediators between
the state and private actors; litigators' decisions affect the way private con-
flicts over power are pursued and they affect the norms of the law itself.
Litigators change both their clients and the law. Whether these powers of
litigators actually assist or hinder the quest for justice is a question liti-
gators-and the legal profession-should constantly ask of themselves.
Those who oversee litigation can learn from Niebuhr that because the
tension between power and justice is unresolvable, the best they can
achieve are provisional standards subject to rigorous and ongoing public
scrutiny. Overseers should not be satisfied with the standards of the mo-
ment, and they should be aware that the interests of litigators who recom-
His RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 144 (0. Kegley rev. ed. 1984); Rice, The Spirit
of the Law in the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, 4 J.L. & RELIGION 253 (1986).
3. All lawyers participate in governance in two important respects. First, the lawyer is an "officer
of the legal system," MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983), although this
phrase makes the lawyer's role too much like that of a state-functionary. Second, lawyers are able to
invoke the power of the state on behalf of their clients.
4. R. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SociETY 4 (1932).
5. R. NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS 118 (2d ed.
1972).
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mend standards may not be identical to the public interest. This Note will
argue that public scrutiny of litigation is best undertaken by focusing on
the nature of the state's interest in the litigation and on what the state
should expect of the litigator who must mediate the state's interest with
that of the client, especially given the litigator's power to effect changes in
the law. This focus connects litigation ethics to political theory.
This Note is divided into three parts. Section I introduces Reinhold
Niebuhr's political philosophy of moral realism. Section II turns to the
work of conventional legal ethicists, critiquing their theories under a ty-
pology of "moralism" and "proceduralism." The moralists misconceive lit-
igation ethics by urging litigators to inject more of their personal moral
beliefs into their professional work-thus distorting the nature of power
in the law. The proceduralists, in contrast, embrace their supposedly
amoral role within the legal system as a whole-thus distorting the nature
of justice in the law. Section III presents a proposal for reconstructing
litigation ethics based on Niebuhrian moral realism. In our adversarial
legal system, the ethical litigator is a master of the maneuvers of power
whose legal judgments help shape the justice of our laws and legal
processes.' The unethical litigator is one who neither acknowledges this
power nor accepts responsibility for the effects of her legal judgments.
I. NIEBUHR'S POLITICAL ETHICS
Reinhold Niebuhr was a Protestant minister who wrote and spoke on
pressing political issues from the church which he led in Detroit from
1915 to 1928, and from his chair of Applied Christianity at Union Theo-
logical Seminary in New York from 1928 until his death in 1971.1 His
work exercised profound influence over American political thinkers, espe-
cially from the 1930's through the 1950's.8 While clearly working from
within the traditions of the Christian religion, Niebuhr has been widely
appreciated by persons outside that religion, and by persons who identify
6. A fundamental point in this Note is that litigators' decisions affect the norms of law. In our
legal system, judges play a passive, neutral role, leaving to the parties (the litigators) the initiative to
shape the case. See, e.g., M. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 135-140
(1986). For examples of how litigators affect the law, see infra text accompanying notes 60-67.
7. For biographical details of Niebuhr's life, see generally R. Fox, REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A BI-
OGRAPHY (1985).
8. Schlesinger, The Political Conscience of Reinhold Niebuhr, ESQUIRE, Dec. 1983, at 394.
Schlesinger summarizes Niebuhr's influence as follows:
Singlehandedly, Niebuhr accomplished a revolution in American liberal thought. His skepti-
cism about fallible man's pretensions to infallibility, his warnings against messianism and uto-
pianism, his ironic portrayal of the gap between righteous purpose and ruthless result, had
profound influence after the [Second World Wiar on intellectual and (a few) political leaders.
George Kennan called him "the father of us all." Ironists in politics like Adlai Stevenson and
John F. Kennedy valued not only his philosophical slant but also his practical wisdom. As
chairman of Americans for Democratic Action, he expounded the chastened and self-critical
but still resolute liberalism that flowed into Kennedy's New Frontier.
Id. at 399.
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with no religion.9 There has been a resurgence of interest in his work in
the last decade.10
For present purposes, Niebuhr's most important work is Moral Man
and Immoral Society, published in 1932.11 This book is an extended at-
tack on liberalism's idealistic misconceptions about the real workings of
power. 2 The liberalism Niebuhr criticized could be characterized as an
attitude of strong optimism and hopefulness concerning human nature and
society, a belief in the manageability of social conflict through the educa-
tion and moral improvement of human nature."
To reconstruct the foundations of this liberalism, Niebuhr sets up a
fundamental distinction between moralists and realists, and calls his own
approach moral realism. In an important passage, Niebuhr writes:
Any justice which is only justice soon degenerates into something less
than justice. It must be saved by something which is more than jus-
tice. The realistic wisdom of the statesman is reduced to foolishness
if it is not under the influence of the foolishness of the moral seer.
The latter's idealism results in political futility and sometimes in
moral confusion, if it is not brought into commerce and communica-
tion with the realities of man's collective life."
Niebuhr's ethics of moral vision and realistic wisdom is frankly dualistic.
9. An example is Justice Felix Frankfurter's comment to Niebuhr after hearing a sermon of his:
"[Alfter the service I said to him, 'Reinie, may a believing unbeliever thank you for your sermon?' He
said, 'May an unbelieving believer thank you for appreciating it?'" F. FRANKFURTER, FELIX
FRANKFURTER RUIINiscEs 291 (H. Phillips ed. 1960), quoted in Rice, Felix Frankfurter and Rein-
hold Niebuhr: 1940-1964, 1 J.L. & RELIGION 325, 328 (1983) (correspondence essay).
10. Niebuhr's thought has been used-some say misused-by President Carter, see Miller, In
Strange Company, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 21, 1982, at 27, 28; Schlesinger, Reinhold Niebuhr's Role
in American Political Thought and Life, in REINHOLD NIEBUHR: His RELGIOUS, SOCIAL, AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 2, at 189, 220; and by George Gilder, see G. GILDER, WEALTH
AND POVERTY 268-69 (1981); Miller, In Strange Company, supra, at 29. Charges of misuse of
Niebuhr by the "left" and the "right" have been raised by Robert McAfee Brown, see Brown, Rein-
hold Niebuhr: His Theology in the 1980s, 103 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 66 (1986), and by Michael
Novak, see Novak, Reinhold Niebuhr: Model for Neoconservatives, 103 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 69
(1986).
11. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4. This Note will also draw in part on Niebuhr's book, The Chil-
dren of Light and the Children of Darkness, R. NIEBUHR, supra note 5. These works are Niebuhr's
most political and least theological books. For a systematic exposition of Niebuhr's theology, see 1 R.
NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN (1941) and 2 R. NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND
DESTINY OF MAN (1943).
12. Moral Man and Immoral Society bases much of its attack on liberalism on a distinction
between the ethics of individuals and the ethics of groups. This distinction, however, is problematic,
and it will not figure in the analysis here-the argument for moral realism can stand on its own. For
a similar critique of this distinction, see R. Fox, supra note 7, at 144, and R. STONE, REINHOLD
NIEBUHR: PROPHET TO POLITICIANS 84 (1972).
13. For a discussion of the concept of liberalism which Niebuhr attacked, see Schlesinger, supra
note 10, at 190-95, and Williams, Niebuhr and Liberalism, in REINHOLD NIEBUHR: HIS RELI-
GIOUS, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 2, at 269-89.
14. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4, at 258. Niebuhr recasts this point in The Children of Light and
the Children of Darkness as the distinction between those who hold to a "too consistent pessimism"
about human potential for justice and those who hold to a "too consistent optimism." R. NIEBUHR,
supra note 5, at xiii-xiv.
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He writes, "An adequate political morality must do justice to the insights
of both moralists and political realists."15 But this is not to say that the
two ways of conceiving ethical questions are hermetically sealed off from
each other. The two always "interpenetrate. ' 16 Each perspective requires
the other to maintain itself, and it is only the two in combination which
can form an adequate ethics. It is easy to see how moralism is concerned
with ethics; the Niebuhrian insight is that because power is essential to
the quest for justice, realism is also concerned with ethics. This Note will
show that moralists and realists in ethics are generally incapable of appre-
ciating the necessary insights of one another and that an adequate ethics
must hold the two in creative tension.
Niebuhr's underlying conception of human society is fundamentally
Augustinian or Hobbesian. 7 He was sharply aware of the factors of self-
interest and power in all communal life.
What is lacking among all these moralists . . . is an understanding
of the brutal character of the behavior of all human collectives, and
the power of self-interest and collective egoism in all inter-group re-
lations. . . . They do not see that the limitations of the human imag-
ination, the easy subservience of reason to prejudice and passion, and
the consequent persistence of irrational egoism, particularly in group
behavior, make social conflict an inevitability in human history,
probably to its very end.'
This basic conflict of power with power is ignored by moralists to the
peril of their goals of social improvement. Niebuhr shared in many goals
of social reform; he wrote over seven hundred articles, many of which
were timely appeals for social reform in industrial relations, race rela-
tions, foreign affairs, and other pressing current issues.'9 Underlying these
practical proposals, however, was a consistently realistic assessment of
human prospects. Niebuhr would probably agree with the remark of
15. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4, at 233.
16. Id. at 4.
17. "[Niebuhr's experience in] Detroit had persuaded him that liberal Christianity, with its senti-
mental and optimistic view of man, was hopelessly irrelevant to the power realities of industrial capi-
talism. A more searching conception of human nature was required, and this Niebuhr found in the
tragic insights of Augustine and Calvin." Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 396; see also R. STONE, supra
note 12, at 104 (on Niebuhr's Augustinianism).
18. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4, at xx. This argument should not be limited to "collectives" but
applied to individual relations as well. See supra note 12.
19. For a bibliography of Reinhold Niebuhr's published writings, see REINHOLD NIEBUHR: His
RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 2, at 531-68. For example, as a minister
in Detroit in the 1920's, Niebuhr supported the organization of auto workers to give them more
power against the oppressive labor practices of their employers. In the 1930's Niebuhr criticized John
Dewey and others for their naive belief that social engineering-without accounting for the profound
interest-group conflicts tearing apart American social life-could create a new society. In the 1940's
Niebuhr was an early architect of the Cold War strategy of containment; he argued that American
values of democracy and liberty could not be protected or advanced without realistic geopolitical
power strategies. See generally R. STONE, supra note 12.
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President Chaim Herzog of Israel in 1985: "It is not enough to be right;
we must also be strong. "20
There is also an epistemological dimension to Niebuhr's presupposition
of social conflict. Reason is not capable, in his view, of rising to a vantage
point above conflict to resolve it objectively. On the contrary, "reason is
always, to some degree, the servant of interest in a social situation.121
While Niebuhr saw reason as an instrument to criticize the fallible and
partial pretenses of human action, he was wary that reason is also the
vehicle by which we seek "to give the sanctity of a false universality to
[our] particular needs and partial insights." 22 Thus, every rational analy-
sis and seemingly reasonable argument is seen by Niebuhr as provisional
and in need of on-going scrutiny and criticism.
This view of political ethics as moral realism is reflected in one of
Niebuhr's few passages on "civil" or "positive" law. In this passage,
Niebuhr sets up the tension in law which is the analytical focus of this
Note:
Usually the norms of law are compromises between the rational-
moral ideals of what ought to be, and the possibilities of the situation
as determined by given equilibria of vital forces. The specific legal
enactments are, on the one hand, the instruments of the conscience of
the community, seeking to subdue the potential anarchy of forces and
interests into a tolerable harmony. They are, on the other hand,
merely explicit formulations of given tensions and equilibria of life
and power, as worked out by the unconscious interactions of social
life.23
Reaching for the ideals of justice yet open-eyed about the present limits of
power-this is the paradox of moral realism. Law serves both functions in
the paradox at the same time. Legal ethicists, however, have a propensity
for stressing one function to the exclusion of the other.
II. A CRITIQUE OF CONVENTIONAL LEGAL ETHICS
Contemporary legal ethicists have not understood this fundamental ten-
sion underlying law in American society. They fail, in particular, to see
that the tension cannot be resolved. Efforts to resolve the tension in either
direction result in misconstruing litigation ethics. This section will develop
a typology of conventional legal ethics based on Niebuhr's political ethics.
Legal ethics scholars fall broadly into two types: those who focus on the
20. Quoted in M. Kampelman, Remarks by Ambassador Max M. Kampelman at the Council of
Jewish Federations (Nov. 16, 1985), reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. S16087 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1985).
21. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4, at xiv-xv. For a critique of Niebuhr's view of reason in Moral
Man and Immoral Society, see R. Fox, supra note 7, at 138-140.
22. 1 R. NIEBUHR, supra note 11, at 302.
23. 2 R. NIEBUHR, supra note 11, at 266-67.
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personal ethics of lawyers in the system and those who focus on justifica-
tions for the established system of rules demarcating appropriate lawyer
conduct. This Note will call the former category of legal ethics scholarship
moralism; it will call the latter category proceduralism.24 It will argue
that the moralists fail to comprehend the conflicts of power underlying
legal procedures and that the proceduralists fail to comprehend the impor-
tance of the legal judgments of litigators in legitimating the power of the
law. This typology is an adaptation of Niebuhr's moral realism, applying
his view of moralism and realism to legal ethics.2"
A. The Failures of Moralism
Moralism in legal ethics is the focus on the personal ethics of partici-
pants in the legal system. Two examples of moralism are the role-
differentiated morality of Gerald Postema2" and the anarchistic ethics of
William Simon.27 The first form of moralism concentrates on the personal
ethics of individual lawyers in whatever legal system they practice. The
second form of moralism advocates a transformation of the adversarial le-
gal system to heighten the importance of lawyers' personal concerns for
justice. After a brief look at the first form, this subsection will focus most
closely on Simon's position.
1. Role-differentiated Morality: Are Lawyers Really Different?
One important school of legal ethics is based on the concept of the role-
differentiated morality of lawyers.28 "Role-differentiation" is a sociologi-
cal term that emphasizes the alienation between the self and the expecta-
tions placed on the self by various roles.2" Postema's legal ethics draws on
this concept. He writes, "In a large portion of [a lawyer's] daily experi-
ence, in which he is acting regularly in the moral arena, he is alienated
from his own moral feelings and attitudes and indeed from his moral per-
24. This typological distinction is original to this Note, and is derived chiefly from Niebuhr's
political philosophy. The proposed typology adapts Niebuhr's moralist/realist distinction to the par-
ticular characteristics of litigation ethics.
25. As with every typology, these categories inevitably oversimplify the positions held by individ-
ual ethicists in each type. To mitigate this difficulty, this Note will take up representative writers in
each type-one writer in each category in some detail, and others at least by outline and notes. The
writers were chosen both because they make their case particularly well, and because they have been
generally influential.
26. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980).
27. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L.
REV. 29 [hereinafter Simon, Ideology of Advocacy]; Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) [hereinafter Simon, Ethical Discretion].
28. Richard Wasserstrom pioneered this approach in legal ethics. See Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTs. 1 (1975). Postema has subsequently refined the
concepts. See Postema, supra note 26.
29. The concept of role-differentiation originated with the sociologist Erving Goffman. See G.
HAZARD & D. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 109 (1985).
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sonality as a whole.""0 In other words, the legal system places expecta-
tions on the lawyer which he must fulfill as part of his role, quite apart
from his own moral evaluation of what he is being asked to do. Over time
his moral personality becomes alienated from his work. Postema proposes
that more of the lawyer's own moral personality should be engaged in his
decisions as a lawyer.
The fundamental problem with Postema's approach is that role-
alienation is not unique to lawyers. Alienation is endemic to every kind of
work that is not completely self-sufficient and self-expressive.3 ' Karl
Marx, to take a well-known example, longed not only for a classless soci-
ety but also for a role-less society, transcending the division of labor.3 2
Perhaps we all share such longings. But Postema is short-sighted to put
this burden solely on lawyers. Why whine about how tough it is to be a
lawyer and a person, when it is so hard to be just a person? While this
approach has some social-psychological value in helping us generally un-
derstand alienation in work, it does not help us understand the issues in-
herent in legal ethics.
2. Over the Abyss: Moralism and Anarchy
William Simon carries Postema's argument a step further, bringing it
into the distinctively legal arena. According to Simon, not only should in-
dividual lawyers be encouraged to bring personal ethical principles into
their advocacy decision-making, but the whole system of advocacy should
be recast to make this its primary goal. In this system, lawyers and their
clients would debate and agree on the means as well as the ends of their
cases. Simon's conclusions and recommendations illustrate the abyss of an-
archism and illusion over which hangs the question of conscience in legal
practice. Simon brings legal ethics to this abyss unknowingly, since he
does not discuss the political premises underlying his recommendations. A
close look at Simon's ideas will show the importance of political theory in
the study of legal ethics, and the particular value of a Niebuhrian
perspective.
30. Postema, supra note 26, at 79.
31. Examples of such alienation include the assembly line (where control is out of one's hands
and uniform processes suppress autonomy), the big business organization (as in W. WHYTE, THE
ORGANIZATION MAN (1956)), and the ordained ministry (ordained ministers "marry the church,"
resulting in dilemmas for those who have real spouses). See generally R. SCHACHT, ALIENATION
(1970) (discussing historical and philosophical origins of concept of alienation and describing its mod-
ern forms).
32. See, e.g., K. MARX & F. ENGELS, The German Ideology, in BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS
AND PHILOSOPHY 254 (L. Feuer ed. 1959):
[11n communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become
accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes
it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in
the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without
ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic.
1096 [Vol. 99: 1089
Litigation Ethics
Simon criticizes the existing conceptions of a lawyer's role, which he
refers to collectively as "the ideology of advocacy." He argues that lawyers
hide behind this ideology, and in their acquiescence to their supposed role
in the system they perpetuate the structures of the status quo. Simon pro-
poses a new form of legal self-understanding and practice that he calls
"non-professional advocacy." He writes that "[t]he foundation principle of
non-professional advocacy is that the problems of advocacy be treated as a
matter of personal ethics."33 How do personal ethics influence legal prac-
tice? "The non-professional advocate presents himself to a prospective cli-
ent as someone with special talents and knowledge, but also with personal
ends to which he is strongly committed." ' How is the lawyer-client rela-
tionship then structured?
[Tihe major principle of conduct is this: advocate and client must
each justify himself to the other. . . . Each must justify the goals he
would pursue and the way he would pursue them. In this manner,
the advocate-client relation is reconstructed in each instance by the
participants themselves. It is not set in advance by formal rules ...
Advocate and client may become friends, not in Fried's sense, but in
the more familiar sense of an intimacy made possible by shared ends
and experience. 35
The foundation of advocate-client relations, according to Simon, is mutu-
ality based on personal sharing. The client (if that term still applies) must
accept the personal goals of the attorney offering legal assistance; the at-
torney must also accept the client's goals, unless both attorney and client
agree to be neutral with regard to each other's goals.
This approach affects the legal system as a whole, not just the lawyer's
ethical self-understanding. Simon notes that "[t]he prevailing patterns of
the regulation of law practice, the practices of the courts, and the style and
substance of legal rules and doctrine" would all need revision.36 Simon
recommends consideration of a variety of "de-professionalizing" reforms
of legal practice." But even systemic reforms could fall short of realizing
the goals of personal ethics in the legal system. He explains:
Progress toward this goal would depend on the particular ends
which people brought to the judicial process, and on the extent to
which the conflict unleashed by non-professional advocacy led to the
enhanced sharing of concrete ends necessary to a social order in
33. Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 27, at 131 (emphasis in original).
34. Id. at 132.
35. Id. at 133 (referring to Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976)).
36. Id. at 140.
37. Id. at 140 n.245. While he qualifies his use of the label "non-professional advocacy" in his
more recent article, his basic position, with all its implications, is unchanged. See Simon, Ethical
Discretion, supra note 27, at 1084 n.1.
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which individuality can flourish. The change would thus require a
certain amount of optimism . . ..
Thus even a legal system reformed along the lines Simon proposes could
encourage human flourishing only if people brought to it the right goals
and if the conflict inherent between persons was transmuted into an "en-
hanced sharing."
Here the political theory implicit in Simon's ethical system becomes ap-
parent. His position depends on the principles of anarchy and could be
called anarchistic ethical idealism.3 9 He assumes that once all the re-
straints of professional rules have broken down, and lawyers and clients
start relating to each other simply as people, a creative unleashing of
pent-up social conflict will create a new, more fluid social order, one that
is more nourishing to individual human potential. At one point he makes
this assumption explicit:
The case against adversary advocacy rests in substantial part on the
conviction that the pursuit of conflict is often better than its sublima-
tion, that conflict can unleash creative energies, that it can promote
understanding and personal growth, and that it can even lead to the
sharing of values needed for its just resolution.'0
Simon believes that intensifying social conflict can strengthen the values of
individuality and genuine sharing, whereas the ideology of advocacy re-
sults in an "anesthetized acquiescence." '
In one sense Simon is right, that the adversarial legal system sublimates
conflicts by diverting them from homes, neighborhoods, and markets to the
formal rituals of procedural justice. This often prevents people from tak-
ing the law into their own hands, anesthetizing their participation.
But that is just the point in a "government of laws, and not of men.' 42
Simon's anarchism, which has been shown to be the outcome of his moral-
ism, threatens the rule of law. Niebuhr would call this optimistic, anar-
chical conviction "illusion," because "it will never be possible to insure
moral antidotes sufficiently potent to destroy the deleterious effects of the
poison of power upon character.' 4 Niebuhr's entire book, The Children
38. Id. at 142 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
39. This is this Note's term, not Simon's.
40. Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 27, at 129 (footnote omitted).
41. Id.
42. Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, pt. 1, art. 30 (1780), quoted in Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258,
307-08 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
43. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4, at 21. Indeed, this critique applies to lawyers themselves, who are
certainly not immune from the effects of power upon character. From the perspective of society, justice
often cannot be achieved without individuals asserting their self-interest; yet Simon would seem to put
the oppressed who seek justice at the mercy of moralizing lawyers. Here proceduralism provides an
important antidote, in focusing on the autonomy of individuals in their use of legal processes for their
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of Light and the Children of Darkness, written in the waning days of
World War II, is a discourse on this "error of a too great reliance upon
the human capacity for transcendence over self-interest""" in situations of
conflict. He would call Simon's error that of "a too consistent optimism in
regard to man's ability and inclination to grant justice to his fellows," an
error which "obscures the perils of chaos which perennially confront every
society, including a free society.""' The danger of unleashing conflict in
the optimistic expectation of human growth is the potential "war of all
against all" in the Hobbesian state of nature, a war which invites the
alternative evil of tyranny.
This is the abyss over which moralism in legal ethics hangs. It reminds
us that legal ethics is but a species of political philosophy. Simon's politi-
cal premises thoroughly control his legal ethics. The consequences of Si-
mon's moralistic re-visioning of legal practice raise hard questions for le-
gal ethics: If an ideal of personal ethics in legal practice leads this far,
must lawyers mute their ethical concerns in order to practice their profes-
sion? Can lawyers bring personal ethical concerns to their legal practice,
or is "legal ethics" an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms? This is the
position taken by the other major type of legal ethicists, the proceduralists.
B. The Failures of Proceduralism
Proceduralism in legal ethics focuses on the established system of rules
that shape lawyers' actions. In this view, lawyers do not make ethical
decisions; they are obligated merely to follow the rules. Only the system as
a whole can be the subject of ethical reflection; lawyers' day-to-day work
is amoral. While the forms of proceduralism vary according to the kind of
justifications that are proposed for the established systems of rules,4" this
subsection will focus on the particular form of proceduralism based on the
instrumental ethics of Stephen Pepper. 47 It will show why proceduralism
is an inadequate basis for litigation ethics.
own ends. See discussion of Pepper, infra note 50 and accompanying text.
44. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 5, at 39.
45. Id. at xiii. Recall in this regard Niebuhr's line: "the foolishness of the moral seer . . . results
in political futility and sometimes in moral confusion, if it is not brought into commerce and commu-
nication with the realities of man's collective life." R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4, at 258; see supra note
14 and accompanying text.
46. Such justifications include: (a) the protection of individual rights embodied in legal proce-
dures, see M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcs IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975); but see Griffiths,
Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359
(1970); (b) the role of the lawyer in representing a client as a special purpose friend, see Fried, supra
note 35; but see Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 379 (1987); and (c) the value of the adversary system in the pursuit of truth, see Professional
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958); but see Frankel,
The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975) (arguing that adversary
system rates truth too low among values that institutions of justice are meant to serve); Gerber, Vic-
tory vs. Truth: The Adversary System and its Ethics, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 5 (1986-87) (describing
courthouse as "lawyers' playpen"). See generally M. DAMASKA, supra note 6.
47. For a good illustration of Pepper's views, see Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A
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Pepper's proceduralist legal ethics sees lawyers as tools or amoral tech-
nicians that enable citizens to exercise their legal rights. According to this
view, lawyers are mere extensions of their clients' interests. A lawyer
makes it possible for a client to achieve her goals within the bounds and
through the means of the law. Pepper notes the apparent moral contradic-
tion between what lawyers do qua lawyers for their clients and the uni-
versal ethical obligations of lawyers as human beings. This is the same
dilemma addressed by Postema,48 but Pepper comes out on the other side.
He defends the role-differentiated morality of legal practice. He says that
"conduct by the lawyer in service to the client is judged by a different
moral standard than the same conduct by a layperson. . . .As long as
what lawyer and client do is lawful, it is the client who is morally ac-
countable, not the lawyer."4 The only standard of evaluation is whether
the lawyer has effectively helped the client reach her goals within the
bounds of law. The lawyer's work is thus, to the lawyer, amoral.
Pepper's argument runs as follows:
Our first premise is that law is intended to be a public good which
increases autonomy. The second premise is that increasing individual
autonomy is morally good. The third step is that in a highly legal-
ized society such as ours, autonomy is often dependent upon access to
the law. Put simply, first-class citizenship is dependent on access to
the law. . . . For most people most of the time, meaningful access to
the law requires the assistance of a lawyer. Thus the resulting con-
clusion: First-class citizenship is frequently dependent upon the as-
sistance of a lawyer. If the conduct which the lawyer facilitates is
above the floor of the intolerable-is not unlawful-then this line of
thought suggests that what the lawyer does is a social good. The
lawyer is the means to first-class citizenship, to meaningful auton-
omy, for the client.5"
Pepper focuses on the lawyer as agent of the client's ends. Lawyers do not
bring their own ends to the relationship, nor should they function as a
kind of "moral screen" to their client's ends. Rather, there must be
"equality of access" in the sense that clients should not have to filter their
goals unequally through the disparate moral views of each individual law-
yer."' The lawyer's conscience is subordinated to that of the client.
The image for a lawyer's task that Pepper adopts is that of a techni-
cian. He presents a picture of
the individual facing and needing to use a very large and very com-
Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
48. See Postema, supra note 26.
49. Pepper, supra note 47, at 614.
50. Id. at 617 (footnote omitted).
51. Id at 617-18.
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plicated machine (with lots of whirring gears and spinning data
tapes) that he can't get to work. This is "the law" that confronts the
individual in our society . . . [who therefore] needs a technician (or
mechanic) to make it go. 2
The lawyer is like an auto mechanic who is morally unconcerned with the
purpose for which the client will use the fixed car.
Pepper's first problem is that he has not thought through the morality
of auto mechanics. The difference between a lawyer and an auto mechanic
lies in the kind of information each has about her client's ends. A lawyer
tends to know more about the ends of her work, which makes her work
more troubling. If an auto mechanic knew she was fixing a car so it could
be used to commit a bank robbery, her "amorality" would quickly disap-
pear. Auto mechanics typically do not face the dilemma of a contradiction
between public and private knowledge; this contradiction, on the other
hand, is intrinsic to lawyering.
Pepper's second problem is his conception of the kind of legal service
which lawyers provide for their clients. He has tried to avoid any adver-
sarial justification for what lawyers do. In the process he has avoided
what it is that lawyers in fact do. By adopting a mechanical model which
seems appropriate for document drafting or other office tasks, as opposed
to litigation, he ignores the relationship between such tasks and potential
litigation. Consider drafting a will, for example. At first glance it may
look like a mechanical application of the arcane rules of devising property.
Will-drafting may be done in an office, but that office is in the shadow of
the courthouse. The arcane rules are employed with care because the will
could well be contested. Lurking behind every phrase are potential con-
flicts over property, contests over power. This is not to reduce all of legal
practice to litigation, but it is to suggest that "use" of the law rarely in-
volves only the client. In every invocation of legal process there is always
potential, if not actual, social conflict over power at stake.
The third and most important problem for Pepper is his conception of
the law. The metaphor of a whirring machine suggests that law is an
impersonal structure of carefully engineered parts. This further implies
that the law is itself rigid and unchanging, since machines are not ordina-
rily affected by the uses to which they are put (as long as they are used
properly). A Niebuhrian perspective on law as the juncture of power and
justice provides a much richer and more accurate picture of the law than
Pepper's machine. Seen as conflict over power, legal process directly
changes the way private parties battle. They must battle within the terms
law provides. Machines do not change their operators, but law transforms
society.53 Seen as a quest for justice, the law is not a static machine that
52. Id. at 623-24.
53. This point is consistent with proceduralists who do not take as static and mechanical a view of
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need only be properly oiled and maintained; law is more like a living
organism that grows and changes teleologically both from internal imper-
atives and from interacting with its environment.54 Litigators' decisions
affect the form and substance of the law. 5
Proceduralists may acknowledge the importance of morality in the legal
system, as Pepper does, a morality which inheres in the rules of the sys-
tem itself. The moral lawyer need then only follow the rules, or properly
use the machine, to stay with Pepper's metaphor. However, this view mis-
perceives the source of legal norms: Lawyers are not only norm-takers,
they are also norm-givers, since their chosen actions actually change the
law (hence producing new legal norms). Proceduralists thus abdicate
moral responsibility; their ethics translates into a political philosophy of
unregulated self-assertion, which, as Niebuhr points out, leads only to
ceaseless struggle. Niebuhr writes:
A too consistent political realism would seem to consign society to
perpetual warfare. . . If self-interest cannot be checked without the
assertion of conflicting self-interests how are the counter-claims to be
prevented from becoming inordinate? And if power is needed to de-
stroy power, how is this new power to be made ethical?56
The proceduralist has no way to connect ethical concerns with the way
litigators actually use the power of the law. This is the proceduralist
counterpart to the anarchism of unleashed personal moralism; for while
the moralist's illusions about power and human nature consign society to
a war of competing personal beliefs with no restraining rule of law, the
proceduralist's confidence in the systemic rule of law divorces responsibil-
ity for that system from the daily decisions of litigators. The moralists
believe they can transcend the perils of power in their quest for justice;
the proceduralists believe they can dispense with the quest for justice in
their use of power."
Thus Pepper's model fails to comprehend the character of power and
the law as Pepper. See, e.g., Hazard, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Costodes? (Book Review), 95 YALE L.J
1523 (1986) (reviewing K. MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1985)).
54. Recall the quote from Niebuhr on the organic character of law in relation to society, supra
note 23 and accompanying text.
55. The ways in which lawyers play a "mediating" function between law and private actors is
developed in Section III, infra.
56. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4, at 231. Recall in this connection the earlier lines from Niebuhr:
"Any justice which is only justice soon degenerates into something less than justice. It must be saved
by something which is more than justice." Id. at 258; see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
57. The twin horns of this dilemma are captured by Niebuhr when he writes, on the one hand,
that the "unhappy consequence of a too consistent political realism would seem to justify the interpo-
sition of the counsels of the moralist. He seeks peace by the extension of reason and conscience;" and
yet on the other hand, "the moralist may be as dangerous a guide as the political realist. He usually
fails to recognise the element of injustice and coercion which are present in any contemporary social
peace." Niebuhr's conclusion, therefore, is that "[a]n adequate political morality must do justice to the
insights of both moralists and political realists." R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4, at 232-33.
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justice inherent in legal practice. The technician provides no more help in
maneuvering through the "brutalities of power" than Simon's zealot. A
lawyer is not a mere conduit between solitary clients and the whirring
engine of the law.58 Pepper's amoral mechanical metaphor fails to capture
the human drama of litigation, with all its complex characters, conflicts,
plots, and settings. Litigators direct this drama in the public fora of the
law. Better metaphors for lawyers' work might be found in politics. But
even the mastery of the manipulations of power would not be sufficient to
make an ethical litigator. Litigators' judgments affect the law itself; they
cannot abjure responsibility for these changes. Proceduralism's amorality
fails to account for the distinctive character of the knowledge which liti-
gators handle, the social conflicts within which litigators use this knowl-
edge, and the public demands for justice placed upon their legal judg-
ments. Litigators' work is inherently moral in the public shape which it
gives to human conflicts over power.
III. LEGITIMATING POWER: TOWARDS A NIEBUHRIAN LITIGATION
ETHICS
We have seen that a Niebuhrian political ethics brings to light the
weaknesses of the assumptions of leading legal ethicists. Neither the mor-
alists nor the proceduralists can adequately illuminate the fundamental
tensions in American legal practice. Every resolution toward one side or
the other can be shown to be partial and misleading. Nevertheless, in the
face of this theoretical deficiency such provisional resolutions must be
made in legal practice every day. Can Niebuhr's political philosophy sup-
ply not only critical theory, but also a basis for a constructive theory of
litigation ethics?
The problems may be insoluble in principle, but there are proximate
solutions and criteria for evaluating these solutions. While Niebuhr never
addressed the issues of legal ethics, certain themes implicit in the Niebuh-
rian critique of moralism and proceduralism developed in the previous
Section can be brought to the surface and expounded. In this light, this
Note contends that the key question for litigation ethics should be this:
How does a litigator mediate between the state's interest in the litigation
and the private parties' struggle for power through the law? This ques-
tion puts political theory front and center in legal ethics. It sees the ethical
dimension of litigation in the extent to which litigation requires private
parties to conform to public norms in their battle for power and in the
extent to which decisions of litigators affect the norms of the law. It looks
to the decisions of individual litigators not to infuse their personal visions
of justice into their clients' cases but to mediate the private goals and re-
58. Nor is a lawyer a mere conduit to the various goals offered by other forms of proceduralism,
whether these goals are conceived as truth, individual rights, or friendship. See supra note 46.
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sources of their clients and the public drama of justice in the adversarial
legal system. This question can guide both litigators and those who over-
see litigation. 9
The term "mediate" needs explanation. The sociologist Talcott Parsons
developed the concept of the lawyer as mediating public norms to private
conduct.60 Parsons argued that private actors must conform (or at least
respond) to public norms of justice when they seek to use the legal system
in their struggles for power; it is lawyers who inform private actors con-
cerning these norms and who form or transform the interests of private
actors to fit the public norms in the course of legal conflicts. As Robert
Gordon has put it, in his explanation of this Parsonian perspective:
The lawyer's job . . . is to mediate between the universal vision of
legal order and the concrete desires of his clients, to show how what
the client wants can be accommodated to the utopian scheme. The
lawyer, thus, has to find ways of squeezing the client's plan of action
into the legally recognized categories of approved conduct."'
In this sense lawyers do mediate public norms to private interests.
Parsons was only half correct, however. The Niebuhrian approach in
59. Those who oversee litigation fit Niebuhr's hopes for the "children of light":
The children of light must be armed with the wisdom of the children of darkness but remain
free from their malice. They must know the power of self-interest in human society without
giving it moral justification. They must have this wisdom in order that they may beguile,
deflect, harness and restrain self-interest, individual and collective, for the sake of the
community.
R. NIEBUHR, supra note 5, at 41.
60. See Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS ON SOCIOLOGICAL THE-
ORY 370 (T. Parsons ed. 1954); Parsons, The Law and Social Control, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 56
(W. Evan ed. 1962). Parsons' view of lawyers was part of his larger functionalist sociological theory.
In a complex, differentiated society, Parsons contended, there have to be some shared values or over-
arching norms that orient diverse interest groups to some common purposes. In an earlier age, this
may have been the role of theology. In modem societies, law is an important source of general norms.
Part of the role of lawyers, then, is to mediate these norms to their erstwhile private clients, helping
align their clients' interests with general social norms. See also Gordon, The Independence of Law-
yers, 68 B.U.L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1988) (discussing Parson's concepts).
This view of the social role of lawyers predates Parsons. however, and need not be tied to his
sociological theory. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 216 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
(lawyer as "an impartial arbiter" between "the rivalships" of society, promoting various interests with
an eye "to the general interests of the society"); A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 243
(J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds., G. Lawrence trans. 1966) (viewing lawyers in America as a separate
estate, an "aristocracy" that provided a social balance between impulses of radical democracy and self-
interested industry); L. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESs-A PROFESSION 329,
337 (1933) (address delivered May 4, 1905, before Harvard Ethical Society) (lawyers should hold "a
position of independence, between the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either
.... "). The concept of lawyer as mediator need not be tied to broader theories of functionalist
sociology, civic republicanism, or liberal legalism.
Recently, Robert L. Nelson has used this concept in his study of lawyers in four Chicago law firms.
See R. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER 232, 266 (1988). Another variation on this model of medi-
ation has been developed in a book review by Geoffrey Hazard. See Hazard, supra note 53.
61. Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasies and Practices of New York City
Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 53
(G. Gawalt ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
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this Note differs from Parsons' in that it contends not only that lawyers
mediate public norms to private actors through the legal system, but that
litigators' decisions on the conduct of their cases also affect the legal sys-
tem. Litigators are not only law-takers, they are also law-makers.6" The
ways litigators frame legal struggles-and their decisions regarding the
use of available legal strategies-change the substance and form of public
norms. Examples of such changes include: (1) the use of discovery as a
financial burden on one's opponent, reducing the likelihood of a case be-
ing brought in the first place, and changing the likelihood and terms of
settlement; 3 (2) the choice of which cases to settle and which to bring to
trial, especially by corporate and civil rights "repeat players" trying to
change the substantive law;' 4 and (3) deciding generally which points of
law to ask courts to adjudicate, and deciding specifically which cases and
which points to appeal, knowing appellate courts (especially supreme
courts) will take a special look at the precedential effects of the issues
involved.65 In a civil law or inquisitorial legal system, these examples
62. This weakness in Parsons' approach is important because Parsons' view of mediation can be
accommodated to proceduralism-lawyers as technicians helping their clients understand how to use
the machine of the law-whereas the double-edged view of mediation as changing the law as well as
clients comports with the Niebuhrian dualism of moralism and realism.
63. The uses and abuses of discovery are widely debated. Some commentators emphasize the
threats posed by litigators' discovery conduct to the goals of the legal system (justice, truth, fairness,
etc.), while others focus on the problems that would result from increased judicial control of discovery.
Both sides acknowledge the importance of litigators' legal judgments in discovery for our adversarial
legal system. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 18 (1980) ("Where the object always is to
beat every plowshare into a sword, the discovery procedure is employed variously as weaponry. A
powerful litigant in a complex case may impose costly, even crushing, burdens by demands for files,
pretrial testimony of witnesses, and other forms of discovery."); Brazil, The Adversary Character of
Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978) (strategic use
of discovery by lawyers in big cases distorts the purposes of discovery); ef. Nelken, Sanctions Under
Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986) (new controls over discovery chill innovation by creative
lawyers and change balance of power in litigation); comment by Judge Jack Weinstein (May 2,
1978), quoted in D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCE-
DURE 847 (4th ed. 1979) ("Much of the present rush to limit discovery is, in my opinion, based on a
desire to close the federal court to prospective plaintiffs and make litigation more difficult for those
who seek remedies."). Professor Hazard puts the controversies concerning discovery into a broader
perspective. He argues that in evaluating the "'litigation explosion'" and the use of obstructive litiga-
tion tactics, one should consider
not only the types of conduct directly involved but also changes in substantive law that emerge
from litigation, the impact of changes in the law on behavior patterns in the community at
large, relationship between the legal norms and behavior patterns, and the effects on the com-
munity's system of authority considered as a whole.
G. Hazard, Authority in the Dock, Address to the Yale Law School Program in Civil Liability
(Working Paper #77), at I (Conference on "Issues in Civil Procedure: Advancing the Dialogue,"
Yale Law School, Apr. 8-9, 1988).
64. See, e.g., Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (making analogy between settle-
ment and plea bargaining where consent is often coerced, bargains are struck by people without au-
thority, and justice may not be done); Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974) (analysis of strategies used by parties
who frequently litigate similar issues or with an eye to goals beyond individual case).
65. While legislators are free to introduce bills concerning any issues they please, courts (at least
Federal courts) are limited by the Constitution to resolving actual "cases" and "controversies." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2. Thus courts are limited to the questions of law which are presented by the cases
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would have significantly less force. 6 However, in our adversarial, party-
driven system, the litigators' legal judgments profoundly affect the form
and substance of the law. The three examples illustrate the kind of legal
judgments which litigators make that do not come before judges. To the
extent that litigators try to hand responsibility for all these law-changing
decisions over to judges-claiming simply to represent clients and to bear
no responsibility for the outcome-they ignore their centrality in our ad-
versarial system. They have also abnegated any sense of professionalism
governing their work. They have lost awareness of the peculiar power of
litigators in the American legal system and of the responsibility that comes
with that power. Official legal procedures are insufficient in this system to
constrain litigators' actions-hence the urgency of professionalism. The
Niebuhrian vision of litigator as mediator advocated in this Note can be
understood as a call for a renewed sense of professional commitment
among litigators.6 7
This way of conceiving litigation ethics in our adversarial legal system
fits the Niebuhrian philosophy of moral realism. First, it is realistic. It
presupposes the "brutalities of power" in the underlying social conflicts
which lead to litigation in the first place. Niebuhr wrote, "Conflict is in-
evitable, and in this conflict power must be challenged by power." 68 Liti-
gation ethics must start with this perspective-not only about the social
conflicts underlying litigation, but also about the role of the litigator who
bears the sword in these battles. Niebuhr's description of the man of
power fits the role of the experienced litigator in an important case: "The
man of power, though humane impulse may awaken in him, always re-
mains something of the beast of prey . . . [tending toward] warlike
sportsmanship toward those who equal his power and challenge it . . .
"69 Litigation ethics cannot be divorced from this reality of social conflicts
over power. Nor, Niebuhr teaches, can litigation ethics dissolve into per-
sonal morality in the hope of more effectively resolving social tensions
outside of a legal system. Such anarchism fails in view of the brutally self-
destructive nature of human beings.
This way of conceiving litigation ethics is also Niebuhrian in that it not
brought before them by litigators.
66. See M. DAMASKA, supra note 6. In a civil law system: (1) the court, rather than the lawyer,
prepares a dossier of the evidence; (2) the court takes a much more active role in "settlement" of
disputes, leaving less room for "repeat players" strategies; (3) the court is integrated into an adminis-
trative apparatus which actively regulates the conduct of citizens by legal rules and tends to abstract
the appellate process from particular facts by deciding pure logical rules of law. Id. at 22-23.
67. See L. BRANDEIS, supra note 60, at 337; see also Gordon, supra note 60 (surveying concepts
of lawyer independence and assessing its desirability). Such a notion is, of course, in sharp contrast to
the "non-professional advocacy" advocated by Simon, see supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text,
and the amoral lawyer-as-technician advocated by Pepper, see supra notes 47-52 and accompanying
text. Both moralism and proceduralism undermine the distinctive American tradition of legal profes-
sionalism epitomized by Brandeis.
68. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4, at xv.
69. Id. at 13.
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only analyzes power, but seeks justice. Litigation ethics sees the legal pro-
cess as more than merely an arena for private battles for power. It pre-
supposes an interest in the litigation which transcends the private interests
of the parties, namely the interest of the state. This keeps litigation ethics
realistic, yet not cynical. For the central role of the state-underlying
every action a litigator takes-forces the private battle to take a distinc-
tively public shape. It forces the participants to frame the battle in terms
of the public norms of evidence and procedure and to accept the results of
the battle as determined by state-sponsored adjudication on the basis of
these norms. Thus, in Niebuhr's language, litigation brings the parties
under the authority of the norms of law as "the rational-moral ideals of
what ought to be"; norms which are "the instruments of the conscience of
the community, seeking to subdue the potential anarchy of forces and in-
terests into a tolerable harmony."7 0 The state-enforced harmony will
rarely be ideal, but it will be tolerable to the extent it actually reflects the
quest for justice. 1
Yet it is not enough for litigators simply to hand over responsibility for
justice through law to the state. Such a proceduralist move relinquishes
the power litigators actually have in our adversarial legal system; 2 it
hands over responsibility for justice to institutions which can never fully
embody it;73 and it fundamentally misconceives the character of legal
change. 4 Litigators have a professional responsibility for the justice of the
American legal system. Theories of litigation ethics which abjure this
claim are neither moral nor realist.
CONCLUSION
No litigation ethics will be adequate until it develops both a coherent
political philosophy and subsequent norms for lawyers' conduct in litiga-
tion. This Note has argued that Niebuhr's political philosophy provides
important insights for litigation ethics. This idea has been developed by
showing how moralism and proceduralism fail to provide an adequate un-
70. 2 R. NIEBUHR, supra note 11, at 266-67; see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
71. In this respect the moralists still play an important role. Moral realism is always in danger of
lapsing into cynicism; thus even the illusions of the moralists have a place in keeping the question of
conscience alive in litigation ethics when they heighten concern over the legitimacy of public norms.
On the necessity of some illusions, especially the "foolishness" of moralists, see R. NIEBUHR, supra
note 4, at 277 (closing paragraph of book); supra note 14 and accompanying text; infra text accompa-
nying note 75.
72. Recall the discussion of the litigator's powers, supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
73. On this point even Niebuhr was not sufficiently realistic. He tended to emphasize the capacity
of legal institutions to impartially adjudicate social conflicts. See R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4, at 238.
However, he did recognize limits on the impartiality of law. See id. at 239. Moral realism does not
exempt the state from critical scrutiny for injustices in the exercise of power. "'Power,' said Henry
Adams, 'is poison'; and it is a poison which blinds the eyes of moral insight and lames the will of
moral purpose." Id. at 6.
74. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (critique of Pepper's mechanical metaphor for
law); supra note 65 and accompanying text (precedent and legal change).
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derlying political philosophy and in sketching a theory of litigation ethics
built on Niebuhr's moral realism. This is only to define the nature of the
task, however. The complete task of developing norms for lawyer conduct
on the basis of this theory still lies ahead.
Reinhold Niebuhr's distinctive contribution to political philosophy was
to place the interest in justice and social reform on the firm foundation of
a realistic conception of the role of power in society. This Note has uti-
lized his concept of power to critique the conventional study of legal eth-
ics, proposing the centrality of political theory for any adequate litigation
ethics and proposing an alternative theoretical model for litigation ethics
along Niebuhrian lines. Such a model is necessary for any effort to in-
crease the justice, equity, or freedom available through legal procedures in
American society.
A final word must be said for what Niebuhr calls the "foolishness of
the moral seer." 5 The study of legal ethics has been marked by a paucity
of such foolishness. The danger is that realism will ossify into cynicism,
and moral vision will be lost. Realism must be held in tension with moral
reason and imagination. Thus, at the least, the study of legal ethics could
benefit from more attention to the goals of law envisioned in philosophy,
religion and literature.7 6 Here the etymological connection between
Niebuhr's moral realism and the jurisprudential school of legal realism is
also worth noting. Law is not an isolated sphere of formal conceptions
sealed off from social reality, but is integrally related to the social powers,
interests, and ideals which both form and are formed by legal norms. In
mediating this relationship, litigators make moral decisions every day.
One can hope, considering the power of the law itself in our society, that
litigators who read Niebuhr will have their moral vision-as well as their
thirst for combat-renewed.
75. R. NIEBUHR, supra note 4, at 258; cf. supra note 14 and accompanying text.
76. Examples that come readily to mind include M. KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS
OF BEING (1984); M KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING (1981); D. TRACY,
BLESSED RAGE FOR ORDER (1975); A. WHITEHEAD, RELIGION AND MODERN SOCIETY (1926); T.
WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987).
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